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ABSTRACT
This paper estimates the effects of environmental regulations on industrial activity. The analysis
is conducted with the most comprehensive data available on both regulations from the Clean Air Act
Amendments￿ division of counties into pollutant-specific nonattainment and attainment categories and
manufacturing activity from the 1.75 million plant observations that comprise the 1967-87 Censuses of
Manufactures. Emitters of the controlled pollutants are subject to greater regulatory oversight in
nonattainment counties. I find that in the first 15 years after the Amendments became law (1972- 1987),
nonattainment counties (relative to attainment ones) lost approximately 590,000 jobs, $37 billion in
capital stock, and $75 billion (1987$) of output in pollution intensive industries. These estimates are
derived from a statistical model for plant-level growth that controls for plant fixed effects, unrestricted
industry shocks, and unrestricted county shocks. Importantly these findings are robust across many
specifications, and the effects are apparent across a wide range of polluting industries. Although the
decline in manufacturing activity was substantial in nonattainment counties, it was modest compared to









I.   Introduction 
Efforts to regulate pollution are among the most controversial interventions mandated by the 
federal government.  This controversy is partially generated by the lack of convincing evidence on their 
costs.  The Pollution Abatement Costs and Expenditures Survey reports that manufacturing plants spend 
almost $30 billion a year to comply with environmental regulations (U.S. Bureau of the Census 1993).  
Manufacturers contend that these expenditures place them at a competitive disadvantage in the global 
economy and leads to the loss of tens of thousands of U.S. jobs.  But previous empirical research is 
unable to consistently translate industry￿s claims into observable declines in manufacturing activity 
(Bartik 1988; McConnell and Schwab 1990; Gray and Shadbegian 1995; Jaffe et al. 1995; Henderson 
1996; Levinson 1996; Becker and Henderson 2000 and 2001).  In fact, some research suggests that 
environmental regulations do not harm regulated firms or their workers and may even benefit them 
(Porter and van der Linde 1995; Bovenberg and van der Ploeg 1996; Berman and Bui 1997; Berman and 
Bui 1998).  In order to set rational policy, it is crucial to understand whether these regulations restrict 
industrial activity.
1 
This paper presents new evidence about this relationship by focusing on the Clean Air Act￿s 
impact on polluting manufacturers.  The Clean Air Act, originally passed in 1963 and amended in 1970, 
1977, and 1990, is one of the most significant federal interventions into the market in the post-War 
period.  Following the passage of the 1970 Amendment, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) 
established separate national ambient air quality standards -- a minimum level of air quality that all 
counties are required to meet -- for four criteria pollutants: carbon monoxide (CO), tropospheric ozone 
(O3), sulfur dioxide (SO2), and total suspended particulates (TSPs).  As a part of this legislation, every 
U.S. county receives nonattainment or attainment designations for each of the four pollutants annually.  
The nonattainment designation is reserved for counties whose air contains concentrations of the relevant 
pollutant that exceed the federal standard.  Emitters of the regulated pollutant in nonattainment counties 
are subject to greater regulatory oversight than emitters in attainment counties.  Non-polluters are free 
from regulation in both categories of counties.  
This paper brings together a variety of comprehensive data files to determine empirically the 
                                                           





effects of these federally mandated county-level regulations on the activity of polluting manufacturers in 
the 1967-1987 period.  I compiled annual data on the four pollutant-specific, nonattainment/attainment 
designations for each of the 3,070 U.S. counties from the Code of Federal Regulations and EPA 
pollution monitors.  The structure of this longitudinal, regulation data allows for the identification of 
cross-sectional variation in these regulations, as well as changes in counties￿ pollutant-specific regulatory 
status over time.  Despite the centrality of these county-level regulations to environmental policy, this is 
the first time that either a researcher or the EPA has produced a data file with these designations for all 
four of these criteria pollutants.
2  The regulation file is merged with the 1.75 million plant-level 
observations from the microdata in the 1967-1987 Censuses of Manufactures (CMs), which asks detailed 
questions about plants￿ characteristics (including county of location), input usage, and output.  The 
combined data file is used to relate the growth of employment, investment, and shipments of 
manufacturers to the federally mandated regulations across the entire country.  
The paper￿s approach overcomes at least some of the objections to earlier studies of the impact 
of environmental regulations.  First, the least restrictive statistical model for the growth of the measures 
of plant-level manufacturing activity controls for plant fixed effects, unrestricted industry shocks, and 
unrestricted county shocks.  The estimated regulation effects are therefore purged of all permanent plant 
characteristics that determine growth, all transitory differences in the mean growth of plants across 
industries, and all transitory determinants of growth that are common to polluters and non-polluters 
within a county.  These controls are important because this period was one of dramatic changes in the 
manufacturing sector, including a substantial increase in competition from foreign countries in some 
industries, a secular movement of plants from the Rust Belt to the South, and two oil price shocks that 
had differential effects on particular industries and regions. 
Second, this paper uses the principal instruments of the Clean Air Act Amendments (CAAAs), 
the pollutant-specific, county-level attainment/nonattainment designations, as its measures of regulation.  
These four designations are the ￿law of the land￿ and capture the regional and industry variation that 
Congress imposed with this legislation.
3  In fact, these designations govern the writing and enforcement 
                                                           
2 McConnell and Schwab (1990), Henderson (1996) and Becker and Henderson (2000 and 2001) use O3 
nonattainment status but did not collect information on nonattainment status for the other pollutants.  
3 A few states and localities (e.g., California) have imposed regulations that are stricter than the federal ones.  Any 
regulations over and above the federally mandated ones are unobserved variables in the subsequent analysis.  This 




of the plant-specific regulations that restrict the behavior of polluters.  Moreover, the simultaneous 
evaluation of all four regulations is important, because many plants emitted multiple pollutants and many 
counties were designated nonattainment for multiple pollutants.  The use of these regulations should 
address Jaffe, et al.￿s (1995) concern that previous studies rely on measures of regulation that are too 
aggregated (e.g., state-level measures) to detect differences in stringency.  
Third, the detailed CMs questionnaire allows for an examination of regulation￿s impact across a 
number of outcomes and categories of plants.  The previous literature generally focuses on the effects of 
regulation on a single outcome variable (e.g., employment) or on a particular category of plants (e.g., the 
location decisions of new plants).  The focus on a single outcome, or on a particular category of plant, 
leaves open the possibility that the effects of regulation are not fully explored.  In contrast, this paper 
examines the impacts of regulation on the growth of employment, capital stock, and shipments.   
Moreover, the paper￿s estimates are derived from a sample that includes existing plants as well as newly 
opened ones. 
The results indicate that the CAAAs substantially retarded the growth of polluting manufacturers 
in nonattainment counties.  The estimates suggest that in the first 15 years after the Amendments became 
law (i.e., 1972-1987), nonattainment counties (relative to attainment ones) lost approximately 590,000 
jobs, $37 billion in capital stock, and $75 billion (1987$) of output in pollution-intensive industries.  
Importantly, these findings are robust across many specifications and the effects are apparent across a 
wide range of polluting industries.  Although the decline in manufacturing activity was substantial in 
nonattainment counties, it was modest compared to the size of the entire manufacturing sector.  
  The paper proceeds as follows.  Section II describes the statutory requirements of the CAAAs 
and the variation in regulation that they imposed.  Section III describes the data and presents some 
summary statistics on the regulations￿ scope.  Section IV presents the identification strategy, and section 
V discusses the estimation results.  Section VI develops two measures of the magnitude of the 
regulations￿ impacts and interprets the results.  Section VII concludes the paper. 
 
II.  The CAAAs and the Variation in Regulation 
The ideal analysis of the relationship between industrial activity and environmental regulations 




Then, the changes in activity among the regulated and unregulated can be compared with confidence that 
any differences are causally related to regulation.  In the absence of such an experiment, an appealing 
alternative is to find a situation where similar plants face different levels of regulation.   
The structure of the 1970 and 1977 CAAAs may provide such an opportunity.  In particular, the 
Amendments introduce substantial cross-sectional and longitudinal variation in regulatory intensity at the 
county level.  This section describes the CAAAs and why how they may offer the opportunity to credibly 
identify the relationship between environmental regulation and industrial activity.  
 
A.   The CAAAs and their Enforcement 
Before 1970 the federal government did not play a significant role in the regulation of air 
pollution; that responsibility was left primarily to state governments.  In the absence of federal 
legislation, few states found it in their interest to impose strict regulations on polluters within their 
jurisdictions.  Disappointed with the persistently high concentrations of O3
4, SO2, TSPs
5, and CO and 
concerned about their detrimental health impacts
6, Congress passed the 1970 Clean Air Act 
Amendments.
7   
The centerpiece of this legislation is the establishment of separate federal air quality standards 
for each of the pollutants, which all counties are required to meet.  Appendix Table 1 lists these air 
quality standards.  The stated goal of the Amendments is to bring all counties into compliance with the 
standards by reducing local air pollution concentrations.  The legislation requires the EPA to assign 
annually each county to either nonattainment or attainment status for each of the four pollutants, based 
on whether the relevant standard is exceeded.  
The CAAAs direct the fifty states to develop and enforce local pollution abatement programs that 
                                                           
4 There are separate standards for O3 and nitrogen dioxide (NO2), and, in principle, a county could meet one of these 
standards, but not the other.  However, O3 is the result of a complicated chemical process that involves NO2 and the 
vast majority of counties that were nonattainment for NO2 were also nonattainment for O3.  As a result, I designated 
a county nonattainment for O3 if the EPA labeled it nonattainment for either O3 or NO2.  All future references to O3 
refer to this combined measure.   
5 In 1987 the EPA changed its focus from the regulation of all particulates (i.e., TSPs) to the smaller PM10s, which 
have an aerodynamic diameter equal to or less than 10 micrometers.  In 1997 the PM10 regulation was replaced with 
a PM2.5 one.  
6 See Dockery et al. (1993), Ransom and Pope (1995), and Chay and Greenstone (2001a and 2001b) on the 
relationship between air pollution and human health.  




ensure that each of their counties attains the standards.  In their nonattainment counties, states are 
required to develop plant-specific regulations for every major source of pollution.  These local rules 
demand that substantial investments, by either new or existing plants, are accompanied by installation of 
state-of-the-art pollution abatement equipment and by permits that set emissions ceilings.  The 1977 
Amendments added the requirement that any increase in emissions from new investment be offset by a 
reduction in emissions from another source within the same county.
8  States are also mandated to set 
emission limits on existing plants in nonattainment counties. 
  In attainment counties, the restrictions on polluters are less stringent.  Large scale investments 
require less expensive (and less effective) pollution abatement equipment; moreover, offsets are not 
necessary.  Smaller investments and existing plants are essentially unregulated.  Additionally, non-
polluters are free from regulation in both sets of counties.   
Both the states and the federal EPA are given substantial enforcement powers to ensure that the 
CAAAs￿ intent is met.  For instance, the federal EPA must approve all state regulation programs in order 
to limit the variance in regulatory intensity across states.  On the compliance side, states run their own 
inspection programs and frequently fine non-compliers.  The 1977 legislation also made the plant-
specific regulations both federal and state law, which gives the EPA legal standing to impose penalties on 
states that do not aggressively enforce the regulations and on plants that do not adhere to the regulations.  
A number of studies document the effectiveness of these regulatory actions at the plant level (Nadeau 
1997; Cohen 1998).  Perhaps, the most direct evidence that the regulations are enforced successfully is 
that air pollution concentrations declined more in nonattainment counties than in attainment ones during 
the 1970s and 1980s (Henderson 1996; Chay and Greenstone 2000 and 2001b; Greenstone 2000). 
 
B.  Which Industries are Targeted by the CAAAs? 
The four regulated pollutants are emitted by a wide variety of natural and anthropogenic sources 
of which the manufacturing sector is a primary contributor.  Within this sector, the pollutant-specific 
regulations only apply to emitters of the relevant pollutants.  An official list of the emitting industries is 
unavailable from the EPA, so it is necessary to devise a rule to divide manufacturers into emitters and 
                                                           
8 The reduction in pollution due to the offset has to be larger than the expected increase in pollution associated with 
the new investment.  The offsets could be purchased from a different facility or generated by tighter controls on 




non-emitters for each of the four pollutants.  It is important that this assignment rule is accurate, because 
the subsequent analysis compares the growth of emitters and non-emitters and misclassification will bias 
the estimated regulation effects.   
After the exploration of a number of alternatives, I use the EPA￿s estimates of industry-specific 
emissions (see Appendix Table 2) to determine pollutant-specific emitter status.  Industries that account 
for 7% or more of industrial sector emissions of that pollutant are designated an emitter; all other 
industries are considered non-emitters.
9  This rule aims to mimic the EPA￿s focus on the dirtiest 
industries in the initial years of regulation.  Its application causes 12 separate industries to be designated 
as emitters of at least one of the pollutants.  The subsequent analysis demonstrates that the estimated 
effects of the regulations are largely insensitive to other reasonable definitions of emitter status.  
Under any rule, each industry could emit any of the 16 (i.e., 2
4) possible combinations of the four 
pollutants.  The 7% assignment rule divides the manufacturing sector such that 8 of the possible 
combinations are represented.  The 7 polluting combinations (with the relevant industry names and SIC 
codes in parentheses) are emitters of: O3 (Printing 2711-89, Organic Chemicals 2861-9, Rubber and 
Miscellaneous. Plastic Products 30, Fabricated Metals 34, and Motor Vehicles, Bodies, and Parts 371); 
SO2 (Inorganic Chemicals 2812-9); TSPs (Lumber & Wood Products 24); CO/SO2 (Nonferrous Metals 
333-4); CO/O3/SO2 (Petroleum Refining 2911); O3/SO2/TSPs (Stone, Clay, Glass, and Concrete 32); and 
CO/O3/SO2/TSPs (Pulp and Paper 2611-31 and Iron and Steel 3312-3 and 3321-5).  The EPA￿s estimates 
of emissions indicate that the remaining industries are not major emitters of any of the four pollutants, 
and I label these industries Clean.
10    
 
C.   Summarizing the Variation in Regulation Due to the CAAAs 
                                                           
9 See the Data Appendix for further details on the determination of pollutant-specific emitting status. 
10 It is informative to compare this division of the manufacturing sector to those in the previous literature.  In each of 
their papers, Henderson (1996) and Becker and Henderson (2000 and 2001) designate different sets of industries as 
subject to O3 nonattainment status.  The current paper￿s set of ozone emitters spans the intersection of their three 
sets, with the exception that the 7% rule excludes Wood Furniture (SIC 2511) and Plastic Materials and Synthesis 
(SIC 282).  Berman and Bui￿s (1998 and 2001) list of regulated industries is not readily comparable to this paper￿s 
list for at least two reasons.  First, their list is not pollutant-specific.  Second, their papers examine local regulations 
in the South Coast Air Basin that are over and above federal and state regulations, so their set of regulated industries 
is likely to be broader than those scrutinized by the federal EPA.  Regardless of these issues, there is substantial 
overlap between their list of industries targeted in the South Coast and the industries that are classified as emitters of 




The structure of the CAAAs provides three sources of variation in which plants were affected by 
the nonattainment designations.  This subsection summarizes these three dimensions of variation and 
highlights their importance from an evaluation perspective.  It also briefly discusses some of the sources 
of this variation and why they may reinforce the credibility of the subsequent analysis. 
The first dimension of variation is that at any point in time the pollutant-specific nonattainment 
designations are reserved for counties whose pollution concentrations exceed the federal standards.  This 
cross-sectional variation allows for the separate identification of industry-specific shocks and the 
regulation effects.  This may be especially important in the 1967-87 period, because there were dramatic 
shocks (e.g., oil crises, recessions, and increases in foreign competition) that differentially affected 
industries. 
The second dimension of variation is that a county￿s attainment/nonattainment designations vary 
over time as its air quality changes.  Consequently, individual plants might be subject to regulations in 
one period but not in a different one.  This longitudinal variation allows for the inclusion of plant fixed 
effects in equations for plant-level growth.  Consequently, the paper presents estimated regulation effects 
that are derived from within plant comparisons under the attainment and nonattainment regulation 
regimes. 
The third dimension of variation is that within nonattainment counties only plants that emit the 
relevant pollutant(s) are subject to the regulations.  This intra-county variation allows for estimation of 
models that include unrestricted county × period effects so that time-varying factors common to all plants 
within a county are not confounded with the effects of regulation.  For example, the 1980-82 recession 
caused polluting and non-polluting manufacturers in Allegheny County, PA (i.e., Pittsburgh) to reduce 
their operations.  Since Allegheny County was designated nonattainment for a number of pollutants in 
these years, this decline would be falsely attributed to the regulations if the intra-county variation in 
emitting status were unavailable. 
Some of the sources of variation in nonattainment status reinforce the credibility of an evaluation 
based on the CAAAs.  Specifically, the county-level nonattainment designations are federally mandated 
and therefore may be unrelated to differences in tastes, characteristics, or underlying economic 
conditions across counties.  Moreover, the nonattainment designations depend on whether local pollution 




evidence suggests that during the years under study many counties were designated nonattainment due to 




III.  Data and Overview of the Regulations￿ Scope 
The subsequent analysis is based on the most comprehensive data available on manufacturing 
activity and clean air regulations.  This section describes the data sources and structure of the data.  It 
also documents the scope of the regulatory program both geographically and within the manufacturing 
sector.  The last part of the section examines whether the characteristics of nonattainment counties and 
the plants within them are similar to attainment counties and their plants.   
 
A.  Data Sources and Structure 
The manufacturing data come from the microdata underlying the five quinquennial Census of 
Manufactures from 1967-1987.  In each census a plant observation contains information on employment, 
capital stock, total value of shipments, plant age, whether it is part of a multi-unit firm, and whether the 
observation is due to a survey response or derived from an administrative record.  The 4-digit SIC code 
and county of location are also reported so that data on which pollutants are emitted and nonattainment 
designations can easily be merged.  Importantly, the CMs contain a unique plant identifier, making it 
possible to follow individual plants over time.
12     
Consecutive CMs are linked to create four periods-- 1967-1972, 1972-1977, 1977-1982, and 
1982-1987.  A plant observation in an individual period includes information from the CMs at the 
beginning and end of a period.
13  Plants that appear in the first census of a period, but not the last are 
considered ￿births￿; analogously, plants that appear in the last but not the first are designated ￿deaths.￿  
                                                           
11 Cleveland, et. al. (1976) and Cleveland and Graedel (1979) document that wind patterns often cause air pollution 
to travel hundreds of miles and that the concentration of O3 in the air entering the New York region in the 1970s 
often exceeded the federal standards.  Figure 1b graphically depicts the counties that were designated nonattainment 
for O3 and reveals that virtually the entire Northeast, even counties without substantial local production of O3, is O3 
nonattainment for at least one period.  It is evident that this region￿s nonattainment designations partially reflect its 
location downwind from heavy O3 emitters in the Ohio Valley. 
12 See the appendix in Davis, Haltiwanger, and Schuh (1996) for a more thorough description of the CMs. 
13 Approximately .5% of plants change SIC codes in a period.  Plants are equally likely to switch into and out of 




Plants that appear in both censuses of a period are labeled ￿stayers.￿
14  There are 1,737,753 plant 
observations in these four periods.  
Each of the 3,070 counties is assigned four pollutant-specific attainment/nonattainment 
designations in every period.  A county￿s pollutant-specific designation in a given period is based on its 
attainment/nonattainment status in the first year of that period (e.g., 1982 determines the regulatory status 
for the 1982-1987 period).  All counties are attainment in the 1967-1972 period, because the CAAAs 
were not in force until the end of this period.  The attainment/nonattainment designations for the 1977-
1982 and 1982-1987 periods are determined from the list of nonattainment counties in the Code of 
Federal Regulations (CFR) in the first year of those periods.
15  The CFR does not list the identity of the 
nonattainment counties in the early 1970s and the EPA does not maintain a historical record of them.  
Consequently, I filed a freedom of information act request and obtained data from the EPA￿s national 
pollution monitoring network for these years.  For the 1972-1977 period, a county is labeled 
nonattainment for a pollutant if it had a pollution monitor reading that exceeded the relevant federal 
standard in 1972.  The Data Appendix provides more details on the determination of 
nonattainment/attainment status.     
There are at least two reasons that this definition of the regulation variables is preferable to 
alternatives based on nonattainment status later in a period.  First, it is unlikely that plants can quickly 
change their production processes in response to regulation.  Second, Berman and Bui (1998 and 2001) 
document that the plant level regulations associated with nonattainment status often set compliance dates 
a number of years in advance.
16 
 
                                                           
14 The permanent plant identifier and the criteria specified by Davis, Haltiwanger, and Schuh (1996) are used to 
determine whether a period-specific plant observation qualifies as a birth, death, or stayer.  The distribution of plants 
across these categories is 29% births, 27% deaths, and 44% stayers. 
15 The publication of nonattainment counties in the CFR only begins in 1978, so this year determines the 1977-1982 
designations. 
16 The determination of nonattainment status from a single year might cause measurement error in the regulation 
variables, leading to attenuation bias in the estimated effects of regulation.  In order to explore this possibility, I 
experimented with designating a county nonattainment if it received this designation in the first or second year of a 
period or the year before a period begins.  (In the case of the 1982-1987 period, this is 1981, 1982, or 1983.)  I also 
used the total number of years during the period that the county is designated nonattainment as a measure of 




B.  The Scope of the Clean Air Act Amendments 
Table 1 reports summary information on the incidence of the pollutant-specific nonattainment 
designations.  The first column lists the number of counties designated nonattainment for each pollutant, 
period by period.  It is apparent that the O3 and TSPs regulatory programs are the most pervasive.  
  The second column details the number of counties that switch from attainment to nonattainment 
between periods, while the third column enumerates the changes from nonattainment to attainment.  It is 
evident that there is substantial movement into and out of nonattainment status between periods.  A 
summary measure of these changes is that of the 945 counties that are designated nonattainment for at 
least one of the pollutants, only 21 retain the same designations for all four pollutants throughout the 
three periods that the CAAAs are in force.  These movements in regulatory status reflect a number of 
factors, including: the EPA￿s increasing awareness of which counties exceeded the federal standards 
(e.g., the large increase in the number of nonattainment counties between 1972-1977 and 1977-1982, 
particularly in the case of ozone), air quality improvement in nonattainment counties, and deterioration in 
attainment ones.  The changes in nonattainment status are important for identification purposes, because 
they allow for the estimation of econometric models that include county or plant fixed effects. 
  Figures 1a-1d graphically summarize the incidence of the four regulation programs.  The shading 
indicates the number of periods a county is designated nonattainment for the relevant pollutant: white for 
0, light gray for 1, gray for 2, and black for 3.  By moving back and forth between the maps, it is possible 
to see that many counties were regulated for more than one pollutant (e.g., parts of Southern California, 
Arizona, and the Rust Belt).  The national scope of the regulatory programs is also evident; all 48 
continental states have at least one nonattainment county.
17 
  Manufacturers that emit one or more of the regulated pollutants and are located in a county that 
is nonattainment for the emitted pollutant(s) form the group that are directly targeted by the CAAAs.  
Table 2 presents the levels of employment for emitters of each of the pollutants and the entire 
manufacturing sector in the four periods.
18 
 The level is calculated as the mean of the levels in the first 
and last years of a period.  The table also separately lists employment in nonattainment and attainment 
                                                           
17 Alaska and Hawaii are excluded from the analysis. 
18 Many plants emit multiple pollutants, so the pollutant-specific rows (e.g., ￿CO Emitting Plants￿) of Table 2 are not 
mutually exclusive.  Consequently, summing across the rows within a single period overstates employment in plants 




counties within the four categories of emitters by period.  
The portion of the manufacturing sector that is an emitter varies across the pollutants.  For 
instance, O3 emitters account for the largest share (roughly 31.7%) of total manufacturing employment.  
The shares for the other polluting industries are 11.2% for TSPs, 9.3% for SO2, and 5.5% for CO.  
Although they are not shown in Table 3, the ranges for capital stock and shipments are 19.9% (TSPs 
emitters) to 46.2% (O3 emitters) and 10.7% (TSPs emitters) to 37.9% (O3 emitters), respectively.   
Regardless of the measure, it is apparent that the pollutant-specific regulations are directed at industries 
that account for a substantial proportion of the manufacturing sector.   
Table 2 also documents that within the four sets of emitting plants, a meaningful share of 
employment is located in both attainment and nonattainment counties.  Consequently, it may be possible 
to obtain precise estimates of the effects of the pollutant-specific nonattainment designations.   
 
C.  Are Attainment and Nonattainment Counties ￿Similar￿? 
An important question is whether the nonattainment counties and their polluting plants differ 
from attainment counties and the polluters within their boundaries.  If these two groups are ￿similar,￿ 
then the attainment counties may form a valid counterfactual for what would have happened to the 
nonattainment counties in the absence of regulation.  While it is impossible to make any statements about 
unobserved characteristics, it is instructive to examine observable ones as they provide some guidance on 
the reliability of the comparisons that underlie the estimated regulation effects.  Further to the extent that 
differences are evident, these comparisons inform the choice of statistical model.  This subsection 
compares counties that are nonattainment for CO in the 1972-1977 period with those that are attainment 
for CO in the same period.  This is only one of the comparisons that underlie the subsequent analysis, but 
it captures many of the themes that are present in comparisons of nonattainment and attainment counties 
in different periods and for different pollutants.   
Table 3 displays the means of potential determinants of plant-level growth within three 
categories of counties.  These categories are comprised of counties that are: attainment for CO in the 
1972-1977 period (column 1a); attainment for CO in 1972-1977 but CO nonattainment in a later period 
(column 1b); and CO nonattainment in 1972-1977 (column 2).  The first panel of the table presents 




CO emitting plants.   
Columns (1a) and (2) allow for a comparison of all CO attainment counties to CO nonattainment 
counties in the 1972-77 period.  It is evident that both the county-level and plant-level characteristics 
differ with nonattainment status.  In particular, nonattainment counties have higher population densities, 
rates of urbanization, average education levels, per capita income, and per capita government revenues.  
Moreover a smaller fraction of their jobs are in the manufacturing sector, and they have lower poverty 
rates.  Importantly, the average number of CO emitting plants is substantially higher in nonattainment 
counties (14.2) than attainment ones (1.0).  Further, CO emitting plants in nonattainment counties are 
younger, more likely to be part of a multi-establishment firm, and they have fewer employees.   
An alternative to using all CO attainment counties to form the ￿counterfactual￿ is to restrict this 
group to counties that are CO attainment in 1972 but CO nonattainment in later periods.  A statistical 
model that includes county fixed effects effectively refines the counterfactual group in this way.   
Columns (1b) and (2) permit an exploration of the similarity of these two sets of counties.  It is evident 
that this subset of 1972-1977 CO attainment counties is more similar to the nonattainment counties than 
was the unrestricted set of attainment counties.  For example, the column (1b) counties￿ mean population 
density, level of education, income per capita, and poverty rate are all closer to the means of these 
variables in nonattainment counties.  However, the average number of CO emitting plants and 
characteristics of these plants remain substantially different across these sets of counties. 
It is apparent that the nonattainment counties and their CO emitting plants are not identical to 
either set of attainment counties.  The obvious conclusion is that nonattainment status is not orthogonal 
to observable county- or plant-level characteristics that may be determinants of plant growth.  Moreover, 
it is plausible that the same is true for unobservable characteristics.  Consequently, it is necessary to 
estimate statistical models that attempt to control for these differences.  The next section describes the 
preferred statistical model and explains its efforts to purge the likely sources of bias, especially those 
identified here. 
 
IV.    Identification Strategy 
In order to explore the effects of the nonattainment designations on the growth of manufacturers￿ 




(1) %∆Ept   = (E pt - E pt-5)/ ((E pt + E pt-5)/2)   
= β1 Xpt-5 + β2t Indi + β3t Nonattainct-5  
+ β4 1(Emit CO = 1 & Nonattain CO = 1)cit-5  
+ β5 1(Emit O3 = 1 & Nonattain O3 = 1)cit-5  
+ β6 1(Emit SO2 = 1 & Nonattain SO2 = 1)cit-5   
+ β7 1(Emit TSPs = 1 & Nonattain TSPs = 1)cit-5 + ∆εpt, 
where ∆εpt = αp + γct + ∆upt.  Here p indexes a plant, c references county, i indexes industry, and t and t-5 
index the last and first years of a period, respectively.  %∆Ept is the dependent variable (i.e., employment, 
capital stock, the value of shipments) and is measured as the percentage change between t and t-5.
19  ∆εpt 
is the stochastic error term.  Equation (1) is weighted by the denominator of the dependent variable to 
account for differences in cell size,  
Xpt-5 is a vector of variables, calculated at t-5 so they are ￿pre-treatment.￿  There are indicators 
for: four categories of plant size based on shipments (i.e., smaller than the median, between the median 
and the 75th percentile, between the 75th percentile and the mean, and greater than the mean); whether 
the plant has operated for at least 10 years; ownership by a firm with multiple establishments; and 
whether the observation is a response to the Census Bureau questionnaire or is derived from Federal 
administrative records.  Previous research shows that these variables are important determinants of plant-
level growth (Dunne, Roberts, and Samuelson 1989a and 1989b; Davis and Haltiwanger 1992).  Xpt-5 also 
contains the average industry-specific wage in the plant￿s county as a measure of labor costs and the 
number of employees at other plants within the same county by industry to capture agglomeration effects 
(Krugman 1991). 
Indi is a vector of industry indicator variables, whose effects are allowed to vary by period.  In 
most of the subsequent analysis, there are 13 industry indicators￿ 1 for each of the 12 industries that are 
classified as an emitter of at least one of the four regulated pollutants and 1 for the remaining ￿Clean￿ 
industries.  These variables non-parametrically absorb all time varying industry-level unobservables at 
the level that the regulations are applied.  Further, the Nonattainct-5 vector contains a separate dummy 
variable for each of the four pollutant-specific nonattainment designations.  These dummies control for 
                                                           
19 This measure of percentage change is an alternative to the difference of the natural logarithms of the year t and t-5 
levels.  It is a second-order approximation to the ln difference measure, ranges from -2.0 to +2.0, and portrays 
expansion and contraction symmetrically (Davis, Haltiwanger, and Schuh 1996).  Importantly, it allows the sample to 
contain observations on ￿births￿ and ￿deaths,￿ that is plants that do not operate in either the first or last year of a 
period.  A comparison of the results from a sample of ￿stayers￿ reveals that the estimated regulation effects are 




unobserved factors that equally affect polluting and non-polluting plants in nonattainment counties.   
Their effect is also allowed to vary by period.  
The parameters β4 - β7 capture the variation in the dependent variables specific to polluting plants 
(relative to non-polluters) in nonattainment counties (relative to attainment ones).  These parameters 
provide estimates of the mean effect of the pollutant-specific regulations on the plants that are directly 
targeted by them.  Henceforth, they are referred to as the ￿regulation effects.￿  An attractive feature of 
this specification is that, in contrast to the previous literature, each of the estimated regulation effects is 
obtained while holding the others constant.
 20  This is relevant because many plants were subject to more 
than one of the nonattainment designations.
21   
  Prior research indicates that there are important permanent and transitory regional determinants 
of manufacturing activity.
22  There are a number of ways to model these factors with this data.  One 
possibility is to include county fixed effects so counties that were never designated nonattainment for a 
particular pollutant are excluded from the estimation of the effect of that pollutant￿s nonattainment 
designation.  In this case, the pollutant-specific regulation effects are estimated from 189 (CO), 730 (O3), 
134 (SO2), and 436 (TSPs) counties.   
As the specification of ∆εpt indicates, another possibility is to include fixed effects for each of 
the more than 700,000 plants in the sample and county × time indicators.  The plant fixed effects greatly 
reduce the degrees of freedom, but they control for differences in permanent plant growth rates that 
might be correlated with nonattainment status.  Such a correlation might occur if nonattainment counties 
provide the conditions necessary for emitting plants or industries to flourish (e.g., easy access to the 
interstate highway system or a workforce that suits their technology).  In this specification, the regulation 
                                                           
20 I also experimented with including the 12 ￿cross-pollutant￿ interactions (e.g., 1(Emit O3 = 1 & Nonattain CO = 1) 
in the specification.  Across the dependent variables and specifications, the hypothesis that they are jointly equal to 
zero is generally not rejected by a chi-square test at standard confidence levels.  Moreover in these plant-level 
regressions, their inclusion does not substantially alter the estimates of the 4 regulation effects.  Notably, the 
interactions are more important in grouped regressions and with stricter definitions of emitter status, as in Greenstone 
(1998). 
21 McConnell and Schwab (1990), Henderson (1996), and Becker and Henderson (2000 and 2001) use the equivalent 
of the O3 nonattainment designation but restrict the effect of the other pollutant-specific designations to equal zero.  
The remainder of the literature uses regulatory measures that do not allow for the pollutant-specific nature of the 
CAAAs. 
22 Bartik (1985) and Holmes (1998) show that a number of regional factors including unionization density, tax rates, 
the provisions of public services, and right-to-work laws affect firms￿ investment decisions.  Moreover, Blanchard 




effects are identified from within plant comparisons of growth rates under the nonattainment and 
attainment regimes.  
In summary, the estimated regulation effects are purged of many likely sources of bias.  For 
example, the specification that includes plant fixed effects, county × time indicators, and industry × time 
dummies, is robust to all unobserved permanent determinants of plant growth, all unobserved transitory 
factors common to polluting and non-polluting plants within a county, and all unobserved industry-
specific shocks.  However, the estimated regulation effects are not robust to transitory determinants of 
growth specific to emitting industries (or plants) located in counties that are nonattainment for the 
emitted pollutant(s).  In other words, county × industry and county × plant shocks to growth are potential 
sources of bias. 
 
V.   The Amendments￿ Impact on Manufacturing Sector Activity 
This section begins by examining an identifying assumption that is common in the previous 
literature.  I then present the estimated effects of the regulations on the growth rates of employment, 
shipments, and capital from fitting the preferred specifications discussed in the last section.  The third 
subsection tests for heterogeneity in the regulation effects across industries.  And the final subsection 
probes the robustness of the results.  
 
A.   Do Location-Specific Unobservables Covary with Nonattainment Status? 
Before turning to the preferred specifications, I explore the validity of the assumption that 
nonattainment status is orthogonal to location-specific determinants of growth.  This identifying 
assumption is pervasive in the previous literature (e.g., Bartik 1985; Barbera and McConnell 1986; 
McConnell and Schwab 1990; Henderson 1996; Levinson 1996; Berman and Bui 1998 and 2001; and 
Becker and Henderson 2000 and 2001).  For brevity I focus on the employment dependent variable, but 
the findings are similar for capital stock and shipments.  
  Table 4a presents two estimates of the effect of the regulation of each pollutant.  The first 
estimate is derived from a sample that is limited to plants that emit the relevant pollutant and is contained 
in column (1).  The column (2) estimate is obtained from all 1,620,942 plant observations with 




to 1 if the county is nonattainment for the specified pollutant and the plant is an emitter of that pollutant.  
Additionally, the two specifications include county fixed effects and industry × time indicators.   For the 
column (1) specification￿s estimated regulation effect to be unbiased, it is necessary to assume that the 
regulation of that pollutant is the only county-level determinant of employment growth that differs 
between nonattainment and attainment counties.  In contrast, the column (2) specification controls for 
unobserved, permanent county-level determinants of growth common to emitters and non-emitters. 
A comparison of the columns (1) and (2) estimates provides an informal test of this assumption.    
The SO2 and TSPs regulation effects are similar in the two columns.  However, the CO and O3 regulation 
effects in column (1) appear to be biased upwards.  Most dramatically, the column (1) O3 estimate 
suggests that nonattainment status at the beginning of a period is associated with a 6.8% increase in 
employment in O3 emitting industries 5 years later.  Since pollution can be modeled as an input and 
regulation as a tax on pollution, standard neoclassical models predict an ambiguous effect on demand for 
other inputs (e.g., labor).  Nevertheless, such a large, positive effect is surprising.  In column (2), the 
estimated O3 regulation effect shrinks to 2.5%, demonstrating the importance of controlling for the 
growth of non-emitters.  It is evident that in the case of CO and O3, nonattainment status is not 
orthogonal to county-level determinants of growth.  This finding was foreshadowed by Table 3, which 
documented differences in county and plant-level characteristics between nonattainment and attainment 
counties. 
 
B.  The Effects of the CAAAs on Manufacturing Activity 
Total Employment 
Table 4b presents the employment results from the estimation of equation (1), using data from all 
plant observations over the four periods.  Heteroskedastic consistent standard errors are in parentheses 
(White 1980).  Since the data are from censuses, the interpretation of what the standard errors of 
regression parameters represent is not straightforward.
23  Importantly, the four regulation effects are 
estimated simultaneously.  The columns correspond to specifications that include additional sets of 
                                                           
23 On the one hand, the sample includes all the members of a finite population so the standard errors of the parameter 
estimates need not be calculated.  On the other hand, the ￿analytical inference￿ view states that the observed finite 
population is a member of an unobserved superpopulation; thus, the standard errors associated with regression 




controls; the exact controls are noted at the bottom of the table.  The mean 5-year growth rate of total 
employment is ￿1.4%.       
The column (1) specification includes industry × period fixed effects and allows the effect of a 
county￿s nonattainment status to vary by period.  These latter parameters non-parametrically absorb the 
transitory variation in employment growth common to emitters and non-emitters in nonattainment 
counties.  Here, the estimated regulation effects are derived from comparisons between all attainment and 
nonattainment counties. 
These initial results suggest that nonattainment status modestly retards the growth of 
employment.  The estimates indicate that a CO nonattainment designation at the beginning of a period is 
associated with an 8.4% reduction in employment levels in CO emitting plants five years later.  This 
estimate would be judged statistically significant at conventional levels.  The TSPs regulation effect is -
2.4% and would be considered significant at the 10% level but not by stricter criteria.  In contrast, O3 and 
SO2 nonattainment status are basically uncorrelated with the respective growth of emitters of those 
pollutants.  Interestingly, the estimated O3 and SO2 regulation effects differ from the estimates that did 
not account for the effects of the other nonattainment designations as in Table 4a.     
Columns (2) and (3) report the results from adding county fixed effects and county × time effects 
to the specification, respectively.  In both cases, F-tests easily reject the null that the additional 
parameters are jointly equal to zero.  As discussed above, the regulation effects from the column (2) 
specification are due to comparisons of counties that experience a change in attainment status over the 
course of the sample.  The estimates in column (3) are based on comparisons between emitters and non-
emitters within nonattainment counties.  In light of the differences in these first three specifications, it is 
striking that the estimated regulation effects are essentially the same across the columns. 
The specification that requires the least restrictive assumptions for unbiasedness of the regulation 
effects is the one in column (4) that includes separate fixed effects for the approximately 738,000 plants 
in the data.  All permanent differences in plant growth rates are controlled for here.  As evidenced by the 
marked increase in the R-squared statistic (.504 compared to .144), the ￿fit￿ of the regression is 
substantially greater.  However, a F-test fails to reject the null that the plant fixed effects are jointly equal 





The intent in estimating this model is to probe the robustness of the estimated regulation effects 
from columns (1) ￿ (3).  In this specification, two of the regulation effects imply a larger negative effect 
on employment and two are essentially unchanged relative to the other specifications.  In particular, CO 
nonattainment status at the beginning of a period is associated with a 16.3% decline in employment in 
CO emitting plants by the end of the period.  The magnitude of the O3 regulation effect is larger and the 
estimate is now ￿0.049; moreover, it would be judged statistically significant at standard levels.  The 
increased magnitude of these two regulation effects suggests that the permanent growth rate of plants that 
emit CO and O3 is greater in counties that are nonattainment for these pollutants.  This finding is 
consistent with the notion that these counties offer competitive advantages to emitters of these pollutants.  
In contrast, the SO2 and TSPs regulation effects are essentially unchanged from the other specifications.
24   
 
Capital Stock 
  The last sub-section documents a robust negative correlation between nonattainment status and 
employment growth.  Here, I explore whether nonattainment status is associated with changes in capital 
stocks.  Investment may be particularly sensitive to regulation, because it reflects plants￿ conjectures 
about future profitability.  Although it is difficult for plants to adjust their capital stock in the short run, 
the length of time between observations (five years) means that any impact of regulation should be 
apparent.  In particular, it is likely that five years is enough time for establishments to bring new 
investments ￿on line,￿ to substantially reduce their capital stock through depreciation
25, to open new 
plants, or to cease operations.  Interestingly, the previous literature finds that environmental regulations 
are not a significant deterrent to new investment in plants and equipment.
26       
There are at least three limitations to the CMs data on capital stock.  First, the CMs￿ measure of 
capital stock is comprised of productive capital and potentially ￿non-productive￿ pollution abatement 
                                                           
24 It is thought that one channel through which environmental regulations weaken polluters￿ competitive position is 
by causing them to hire additional non-production workers (e.g., engineers or environmental compliance officers) 
that aid in ensuring adherence with the regulations but do not directly contribute to the production of the firm￿s 
output.  I examined this hypothesis and find that the regulations￿ effects were approximately equal across production 
and non-production workers.  In other words, these data do not support this hypothesis. 
25 Dixit and Pindyck (1994) show that the sunk cost nature of many investments combined with uncertainty about the 
future may make it more profitable for a firm to respond to a large negative shock by allowing its capital stock to 
depreciate, rather than by ceasing operations.   
26 A review article concludes that, ￿environmental regulations do not deter investment to any statistically or 




equipment that is mandated by the regulations.  This combined measure may cause the estimated 
regulation effects to be biased upward, relative to the preferred measure of productive investment.
27  
Second, the book value method is used to measure capital stock, which likely overstates the importance 
of recent investment relative to a perpetual inventory measure.
28  Third, the capital stock measure does 
not allow for a test of whether the regulations cause plants to change the rate of new investment and/or 
affect the value of existing capital.  A measure of capital stock that separates new investment from the 
depreciation/retirement of existing capital would allow for a more nuanced analysis. 
The top panel of Table 5 presents estimates of the impact of the nonattainment designations on 
capital stock accumulation.  The mean five-year growth rate of capital stock using the book value method 
is 36.5%.  The columns correspond to specifications that include additional sets of controls as in Table 
4B.   
Across the specifications, the capital stock estimates suggest that nonattainment status retards 
investment, but the evidence is less decisive than in the employment regressions.  Similar to the 
employment results, the estimated regulation effects are roughly constant across the first three 
specifications.  The commonality of these estimates is especially apparent in the context of the standard 
errors.  The estimates indicate that the effect of the nonattainment designations on capital stock ranged 
from small, positive (TSPs) to somewhat large and negative (CO and SO2).  However, the column (3) CO 
regulation effect is the only one that would be judged statistically different than zero.  
The addition of plant fixed effects in column (4) greatly increases the R-squared statistic.  But 
the null that these extra parameters are jointly equal to zero is not rejected at conventional significance 
levels.  As in the employment regressions, this specification indicates that the nonattainment designations 
have a larger negative impact on growth.  In particular, the estimated regulation effects from this 
                                                           
27 The ￿lumping￿ of these two types of investment together introduces a positive, mechanical relationship between 
regulation and observed investment.  A preferred measure of capital stock would exclude the investments in 
pollution abatement equipment that were mandated by the Amendments.  The 1986 Pollution Abatement Costs and 
Expenditures survey provides some indirect evidence on the magnitude of this bias.  It shows that the heaviest 
polluting industries devote approximately 4%-10% of total investment to abatement equipment.  This share is likely 
to be larger in nonattainment counties and indicates that the upward bias may not be insignificant.  See Becker 
(2001). 
28 A book value system permanently records the value of an investment at its purchase price.  This value is never 
updated to reflect inflation or changes in the good￿s market value.  Therefore, the relative contribution of recent 
investment, which is entered in current dollars, is overstated.  A perpetual inventory measure of capital stock 




specification are -0.092 for CO, -0.041 for O3, -0.063 for SO2, and -0.043 for TSPs.  The loss of the 
approximately 700,000 additional degrees of freedom causes three of the four standard errors to increase 
so that the null hypothesis of zero is not rejected for any one of them.     
 
Shipments 
In a standard neoclassical model where pollution, labor, and capital are inputs in the production 
process, the predicted effect of regulation, which increases the ￿cost￿ of pollution, on labor and capital 
demand is ambiguous.  However, the theoretical prediction on output is unambiguously negative.   
Consequently, the shipments results provide a more direct test of whether nonattainment status affects 
polluters. 
The bottom panel of Table 5 reports estimation results for the growth in constant dollar 
shipments.  The mean five-year growth rate is 10.0%.
29  In columns (1) ￿ (3), the CO regulation effect is 
negative and statistically distinguishable from zero in two of the three specifications.  These estimates 
indicate that CO nonattainment status is associated with a 3.6%-7.2% decrease in shipments by CO 
emitters.  The O3 regulation effect is small and positive, while the SO2 and TSPs regulation effects are 
small and negative.   
As with the employment and capital stock regressions, controlling for plant fixed effects in 
column (4) causes the estimated negative effects of nonattainment status to be of a greater magnitude.  In 
this specification, the estimated regulation effects are -0.146 for CO, -0.032 for O3, -0.010 for SO2, and -
0.032 for TSPs.  Again the interpretation of the standard errors is not obvious, but the CO regulation 
effect is the only that is statistically significant at conventional levels.  Overall, these results imply that 
nonattainment status, particularly CO nonattainment status, is associated with a reduction in shipments 
by polluting manufacturers. 
 
A Comparison of the Estimates Across the Dependent Variables 
A comparison of the estimates across the three dependent variables within and across 
specifications provides a crude view into the ￿black box￿ of how firms respond to environmental 
                                                           
29 The Bartelsman and Gray (1994) NBER Productivity Database four digit industry deflators are used to express the 




regulations.  For example, consider the CO regulation effects.  In the columns (1) ￿ (3) specifications, the 
regulation effects range from -0.075 to -0.086 for employment, -0.047 to ￿0.097 for capital stock, and -
0.036 to -0.072 for shipments.  The estimates from the column (4) specification are -0.163, -0.092, and -
0.146, respectively.  Within these two divisions of the specifications, the estimates are approximately 
equivalent across the dependent variables, particularly in the context of the associated standard errors.  
The same pattern is evident in the effects of the other nonattainment designations, although they are not 
as large either economically or statistically.  Overall the estimates suggest that the regulations cause 
employment, capital stock, and shipments to decline by roughly equivalent proportions.
30 
 
C.  Is there Heterogeneity in the Regulation Effects Across Industries? 
This sub-section explores whether the regulation effects vary by industry.  This is informative for 
at least two reasons.  First, it serves as an internal validity check on the above results.  If the entire 
regulation effects are concentrated in a small subset of emitting industries, it may be reasonable to 
presume that the estimated regulation effects are due to an unobserved factor that is unrelated to 
regulation.  As an example, union activism might differ over time and the union activity in a particular 
industry might be more heavily concentrated in nonattainment counties.  Further such an unobserved 
factor could interact with the dramatic reductions in demand experience by some industries during the 
examined period; for instance, employment of production workers in Primary Metal Industries (SIC Code 
33) declined from 1,059,000 in 1967 to only 538,000 in 1987.  Second, it provides an opportunity to 
measure the effects of these regulations across industries.  This might prove useful in evaluating the 
claims that particular industries are especially harmed by the CAAAs. 
Table 6 presents the industry-specific regulation effects from the estimation of equation (1) for 
employment.  The results are qualitatively similar for capital stock and shipments but are not presented 
here due to space considerations.  The estimated specification includes plant fixed effects, county × time 
effects, and industry × time effects, as in column (4) of Table 4b.  The regulation effects are allowed to 
vary across the industries that emit the relevant pollutant so there are a total of 23 estimated regulation 
effects.  Columns (1)-(12) report the industry-specific regulation effects and heteroskedastic consistent 
                                                           
30 It would be informative to have plant-level data on pollution emissions.  This data would allow for the calculation 
of the marginal rate of technical substitution between pollution and labor or capital.  These measures of the ease of 




standard errors (in parentheses), where each column pertains to an industry.  By reading across a row, it 
is possible to compare the pollutant-specific regulation effects in each of the relevant industries.  Column 
(13) lists the chi-square statistic and associated p-value (in parentheses) from tests that the pollutant-
specific regulation effects are equal across industries. 
  A number of points emerge from the table.  First, it is apparent that the estimation of industry-
specific regulation effects demands a lot from the data, as the standard errors are substantially larger than 
they were in Table 4b.  The decrease in precision is partially due to the fact that a number of the plants 
that emitted multiple pollutants were located in counties that were nonattainment for multiple pollutants 
(recall Figures 1a-1d), which make it difficult to separately identify them.  Interestingly, the positive 
estimates tend to be especially poorly determined.   
Second, the four chi-square tests fail to reject the null hypothesis that the pollutant-specific 
regulation effects are equal across industries.  This is certainly related to the imprecision of the estimates, 
but an ￿eye-ball￿ test does reveal striking similarities in the parameters within a row (see especially the 
CO and TSPs effects).  I conclude that the estimated regulation effects in Table 4b do not reflect the 
experiences of a small subset of emitting industries. 
Third, almost all of the emitting industries are negatively impacted by the nonattainment 
designations.  Only 5 of the 23 estimated industry-specific regulation effects are greater than zero.  Of 
these 5, 4 occur in industries that emit other pollutants for which the associated regulation effect is 
negative; thus, the overall effect of the CAAAs on these industries may still be negative.   
Fourth, the total effect of the regulations is particularly harsh on industries that emit multiple 
pollutants in counties that are nonattainment for those pollutants.  For example, a literal interpretation of 
the coefficients suggests that Pulp and Paper plants located in counties that are nonattainment for all four 
pollutants at the beginning of a period experience an employment decline of almost 29% over 5 years.  
Similar calculations suggest that employment declines by 14.1% in a period at Petroleum Refining plants 
in counties that are nonattainment for CO, O3, and SO2.   
 
D.   Robustness Checks 
  This paper has used variation in regulation across counties, industries, and time in an effort to 




experimental design, there is a form of unobserved heterogeneity that can explain the findings without a 
causal interpretation.  In addition to the efforts presented above, I probed the robustness of the estimates 
in a number of other ways but found little evidence that undermines the basic conclusions. 
  Table 7 reports the results of some of these robustness checks in columns (1) ￿ (3).  The entries 
are the estimated regulation effects and heteroskedastic standard errors (in parentheses) from separate 
regressions for the three dependent variables.  The dependent variable is denoted in bold and underlined.  
Each column represents a different specification or sample.  All specifications include county × period 
fixed effects and industry × period effects.  The results are qualitatively similar when the specification 
with plant fixed effects is estimated, but the standard errors increase substantially because two of the 
robustness checks significantly cut the sample size.  The entries in column (0) are taken from column (3) 
of Tables 4b (employment) and 5 (capital stock and shipments) and should be compared to the entries in 
the other columns.   
  One potential source of bias arises from the manner in which nonattainment status is determined 
and dynamics in the growth of manufacturing activity.  Recall that a county￿s nonattainment designations 
are determined by its pollution concentrations, which are increasing in manufacturing activity.  Thus, 
nonattainment status in the first year of a period is likely an increasing function of previous growth.  This 
may induce a mechanical correlation between the regulation variables and the unobserved components of 
the dependent variable in equation (1) if manufacturing growth follows a dynamic process.  When the 
process is mean reverting, this correlation is likely to bias the estimated regulation effects downwards.
31   
  To determine whether the above results are due to dynamics, column (1) presents results from the 
estimation of an equation that includes the lagged value of the dependent variable (i.e., the percentage 
change between t-5 and t-10) and interactions of the lag with the four pollutant emitted indicators as 
controls.  The parameters from the lagged dependent variables are not reported in the table but provide 
evidence of dynamic patterns of growth in manufacturing activity.  The commonality of the estimates in 
columns (0) and (1) imply that the regulation effects are not due to mean reversion.
32   
                                                           
31 To understand the direction of bias, consider the case where there is ￿above-average￿ growth among emitters of a 
pollutant in a county in the period between t-5 and t-10.  This growth might cause the county to be designated 
nonattainment in t-5.  If the dependent variable follows a mean reverting process, these polluters are likely to have 
smaller growth in the period between t and t-5.  This slower growth would have occurred even in the absence of 
regulation, yet the regression would attribute this decline to regulation. 




It is generally assumed that environmental regulations￿ primary impact is on the location 
decisions of new plants (e.g., Bartik 1985; McConnell and Schwab 1990) and that through ￿grandfather￿ 
clauses and political lobbying incumbent plants are able to escape regulation.  In column (2) of Table 7, 
the sample is limited to ￿stayers,￿ that is plants that are operating in both the first and last years of a 
period.   The estimated regulation effects in this column are remarkably similar to those from the base 
specification, indicating that the regulations also restrict the growth of ￿stayers.￿  The negative 
coefficients from the capital stock regression are noteworthy, because the required installation of ￿end of 
the line￿ pollution abatement equipment that increases measured investment (but not productive 
investment) is thought to be especially prevalent among ￿stayers.￿
33   
I also examine the sensitivity of the estimated regulation effects to the definitions of emitting 
status.  For example, column (3) of Table 7 presents the results from regressions where the group of 
emitters is expanded such that industries that account for more than 4.5% of the industrial sector￿s 
emissions are classified as an emitter of that pollutant (see Appendix Table 2).  The estimated regulation 
effects are generally unchanged by this expansion of the list of emitters.  Further, I tested whether the 
effects differed when an industry had to account for 9% of industrial sector emissions to quality as a 
polluter.  The estimated regulation effects are also qualitatively similar in this case.
34 
Another possible source of bias is that plants located in a county that is currently nonattainment 
but is ￿expected￿ to become attainment in the near future might delay investments until the regulation 
designation is changed.  In the presence of this type of temporal shifting, the estimated regulation effects 
would be negative but over longer periods regulation would have no effect on manufacturing activity.  In 
order to explore this possibility, I restricted the sample so that plant observations from counties that are 
nonattainment for a particular pollutant in that period but attainment for the same pollutant in the next 
period are dropped.  This sample restriction is implemented 4 separate times, once for each of the 
pollutant-specific nonattainment designations.  The estimated regulation effects from these restricted 
samples are statistically indistinguishable to those from the full sample.  These results indicate that it is 
unlikely that this form of temporal shifting of investment is the source of the estimated regulation effects. 
A further potential source of bias comes from unobserved regional shocks to industries.  I 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
dependent variables.  
33 Greenstone (1998) provides evidence on the regulations￿ effect on plant location and exit decisions. 




estimated a model that controlled for unrestricted industry × period × region effects, where industry is 
defined as one of the 13 ￿industries￿ described above and regions are the nine Census Bureau regions of 
the U.S.  The estimated regulation effects from this specification are also similar to those presented in 
Tables 4b and 5.  Additionally, I fit a model that allows the industry shocks to vary at the state level, 
rather than the Census region level.  In a further specification, I disaggregated industry and estimated an 
equation that includes SIC 3 digit industry × period × region effects.  Neither of these alternatives 
substantially changes the estimated regulation effects.  Overall, there is little evidence that the regulation 
effects are due to regional industry shocks. 
Finally, due to the coincidence of the implementation of these regulations and the decline in 
manufacturing activity in ￿Rust Belt￿ states, it is sometimes thought that the regulations caused this 
decline (e.g., Kahn 1999).
35  To examine this possibility, I separately estimated the regulation effects on 
samples from the Rust Belt and non-Rust Belt states.  Across the three measures of manufacturing 
activity, the estimates indicate that the regulations retard the growth of polluting manufacturers in both 
sets of states.   
 
VI.   The Magnitude of the Regulation Effects and their Interpretation 
  The above analysis indicates that the CAAAs reduced the relative growth of pollution intensive 
manufacturing activity in nonattainment counties. This section provides answers to three important 
questions about the estimated regulation effects.  How large are they?  Can they be used to assess claims 
that the CAAAs cause manufacturers to shift production (and jobs) abroad?  Further, do they provide 
estimates of the costs of the CAAAs that can be compared to estimates of its benefits? 
 
A.   The Magnitude of the Regulation Effects 
Table 8 develops two measures of the magnitude of the regulation effects.  Notice that there are 
three panels, one for each of the measures of manufacturing activity.  The first column presents the 
estimated regulation-induced change in the measures of activity.  This is calculated by multiplying the 
sum of the activity in affected plants (recall, Table 2) by the relevant estimated regulation effects from 
the specification that includes plant fixed effects (i.e., column (4) of Tables 4b and 5).  They are 
                                                           




presented separately for each regulation effect and the sum of the regulation-induced changes is in the 
￿All Manufacturers￿ row.  Column (2) lists the 95% confidence interval of these estimates.   Column (3) 
reports the change in the measure of activity between the period when the CAAAs were first in force and 
the last period (i.e., 1972-77 and 1982-87), separately for emitters of each of the pollutants and the entire 
manufacturing sector.   Finally, column (4) lists the mean of the levels from these two periods for the 
same categories of plants. 
The entries in columns (1), (3), and (4) are used to calculate the two measures of the magnitude 
of the regulation effects.  Column (5) reports the ratio of the entries in columns (1) and (3) and column 
(6) lists the ratio of columns (1) and (4).  Thus, these columns normalize the regulation-induced changes 
by the total change in and mean of the measures of activity.   
The top panel reports these calculations for employment.  For example, employment in CO 
emitting industries located in CO nonattainment counties declined by 119,100 jobs (relative to CO 
emitters in CO attainment counties) in the first 15 years that the CAAAs were in force.
36  The 95% 
confidence interval of this estimate is [-54,600, -183,500].  Analogous calculations indicate that the 
cumulative regulation induced change [95% confidence interval] in employment in nonattainment 
counties is ￿423,400 [-169,400, -677,400] for O3, 800 [57,400, -55,800] for SO2, and ￿50,200 [48,200, -
148,500] for TSPs.  The large decline in O3 employment reflects the high levels of employment in O3 
emitting industries.  The sum of the regulation-induced changes is 591,900 [-118,400, -1,065,200].  
The first measure of the magnitude indicates that the total regulation-induced change is almost 
2.4 times as large as the decline in manufacturing sector employment (roughly 250,000 jobs).  This ratio 
appears large, but it primarily reflects that manufacturing sector employment was flat.  The second 
measure reveals that the regulation-induced change in nonattainment counties was a more modest 3.4% 
of total manufacturing sector employment.  
  The second and third panels present the analogous calculations for capital stock and shipments, 
respectively.  The cumulative regulation-induced changes in capital stock and shipments across all four 
regulations are $36.6 billion [$16.4 billion, -$89.6 billion] and $75.5 billion (1987$) [$27.4 billion, -
$178.0 billion], respectively.  These changes are 8.9% and 33.1% of the total change in these measures of 
                                                           
36 This is calculated by multiplying the estimated effect of CO nonattainment status (-0.163) by the sum of the levels 
of employment in CO emitting plants located in nonattainment counties for 1972-1977 (201,108), 1977-1982 




manufacturing activity.  When they are normalized by the mean levels of capital stock and shipments, 
they are 6.5% and 3.7%, respectively.   
Overall these two measures indicate that during the first 15 years that the CAAAs were in force, 
the cumulative regulation-induced changes in manufacturing activity in nonattainment counties were not 
insignificant relative to either changes in or the level of total manufacturing sector activity.  It is 
important to bear in mind, however, that the legislation also specified regulations for attainment counties.  
Consequently, it is likely that the effects of the CAAAs would be larger if the comparison were to 
counties that were not subject to any regulation.  
 
B.   Interpretation   
It would be informative if the estimated regulation effects could be used to determine how much 
production (and employment) was shifted abroad due to the CAAAs.
 37  This would provide one measure 
of the national costs of these regulations.  Unfortunately, such a calculation is not possible because it 
cannot be determined whether the lost activity in nonattainment counties moved to foreign countries or 
attainment counties.  Since it is likely that the regulation effects partially reflect some shifting of 
manufacturing activity within the U.S., they probably overstate the national loss of activity.  Moreover, 
the possibility of intra-country shifting means that the regulation effects are also likely to overstate losses 
in nonattainment counties.  This is because the identification strategy relies on comparisons between 
nonattainment and attainment counties, which leads to double counting when production is moved from a 
nonattainment county to an attainment one.
38 
There are at least two reasons to doubt that the regulation effects entirely reflect a movement of 
plants from nonattainment to attainment counties.  First, counties frequently moved into and out of 
nonattainment status.  Thus firms may have found it unreasonable to assume that they could remain in the 
U.S. and escape future regulation.  Second, production in many of the regulated industries (e.g., iron and 
                                                           
37 A related question is whether environmental regulations alter the international location decisions of polluters.  An 
extrapolation of this paper￿s findings to this question suggests that international differences in the stringency of 
environmental regulation will tend to shift polluters￿ production to countries with relatively lax environmental 
standards. 
38 In the extreme, the estimated regulation effects entirely reflect a movement of manufacturing activity from 
nonattainment to attainment counties.  In this scenario there would be no loss of production (and jobs) to foreign 
countries.  Further, the regulation effects would overstate the lost production in nonattainment counties by a factor of 




steel and pulp and paper) requires substantial ￿sunk￿ costs that make it costly to shift locations. 
The estimated regulation effects have an additional limitation as a measure of the costs of 
regulation.  They are calculated in terms of employment, investment, and shipments but these measures 
are not readily comparable to standard measures of the benefits of regulation.  The conversion of these 
measures into a monetary unit would have great practical importance.  For instance, it would then be 
possible to compare the costs of the regulations with hedonic housing market estimates of the monetary 
gains to homeowners from regulation-induced pollution reductions.   
  A full monetizing of the regulation-induced losses is left to future research, but it is worth noting 
that this task is tractable.  In a freely functioning market economy, jobs and capital are not lost or made 
obsolete.  In response to a shock like the imposition of environmental regulations, these factors of 
production generally become employed in another capacity.  Thus, the losses due to regulation are the 
adjustment costs associated with the shifting of resources to new sectors.  It is evident that monetized 
estimates of the costs of the CAAAs require reliable estimates of the magnitude of these frictions.   
I close this section by noting that recent research indicates that these frictions may be quite 
substantial and can persist for as long as a decade (Blanchard and Katz 1992).  Jacobson, LaLonde, and 
Sullivan (1993) document that displaced workers endure substantial wage losses.  Consequently, people 
who lost their jobs due to environmental regulations may have suffered substantial long-run wage 
declines.  
 
VII.   Conclusions 
This paper provides new evidence that environmental regulations retard industrial activity.  I find 
that in the first 15 years after the CAAAs became law (1972-1987), nonattainment counties (relative to 
attainment ones) lost approximately 590,000 jobs, $37 billion in capital stock, and $75 billion (1987$) of 
output in polluting industries.  Although these estimates are not derived from a randomized experiment 
and therefore cannot meet a strict definition of causality, they provide robust evidence that these 
regulations deter the growth of polluters.  In the first place, the findings are derived from the most 
comprehensive data available on clean air regulations and manufacturing activity.  Second, the preferred 
statistical model for plant level growth controls for all permanent plant characteristics, unrestricted 




specifications.  Finally, the regulation effects are evident across three different measures of 
manufacturing activity and a wide range of polluting industries.   
  The ozone and particulates standards were tightened recently, causing a substantial increase in 
the number of nonattainment counties.
39  The balance of evidence from this paper suggests that the new 
nonattainment counties will experience reductions in employment, investment, and shipments in 
polluting industries.  To gain a clearer understanding of whether it is worthwhile to incur the costs 
associated with these reductions, it is crucial to understand the regulations￿ effectiveness at cleaning the 
air and the benefits of cleaner air.  Recent research finds that these policies are effective at reducing air 
pollution concentrations and that cleaner air, particularly reductions in TSPs, provides substantial 
monetary benefits to homeowners and reduced infant mortality rates (Smith and Huang 1995; Henderson 
1996; Chay and Greenstone 2000, 2001a, and 2001b).  Regardless of whether these policies pass or fail a 
cost-benefit test, this paper￿s findings undermine the contention that environmental regulations are 
costless or even beneficial for the regulated. 
 
 
                                                           
39 Although legal wrangling over this policy change is not concluded, the Supreme Court￿s Whitman v. American 





a.  Determining the County-Level, Pollutant-Specific Regulation Designations 
The centerpiece of the Clean Air Act Amendments is the annual, county-level assignment of 
nonattainment and attainment status for CO, O3, SO2, and TSPs.  This section describes how these 
designations are determined for each of the four periods (i.e., 1967-1972, 1972-1977, 1977-1982, 1982-
1987) examined in this paper. 
  Although the 1970 Amendment passed before the 1967-1972 period ended, the associated 
enforcement activities did not commence until late 1971 (Liroff 1986).  Consequently, all counties are 
designated attainment for the four pollutants in the 1967-1972 period. 
  The determination of the nonattainment statuses in the 1977-1982 and 1982-1987 periods is 
relatively straightforward.  In 1978 the EPA began to publish annually a list of nonattainment counties in 
the Code of Federal Regulations (CFR).
40  For each of the regulated pollutants, the CFR lists every 
county as, ￿does not meet primary standards,￿ ￿does not meet secondary standards,￿ ￿cannot be 
classified,￿ ￿better than national standards,￿ or ￿cannot be classified or better than national standards.￿  
Further, the CFR occasionally indicates that a part of a county did not meet the primary standards.  For 
the 1977-1982 (1982-1987) period, a county to the pollutant-specific nonattainment category if all or part 
of it failed to meet the pollutant-specific ￿primary standards￿ in 1978 (1982); otherwise, it is assigned to 
the pollutant-specific attainment category.  These annual, county-level, pollutant-specific designations 
were hand entered for the 3,070 U.S. counties. 
The determination of the identities of the nonattainment counties in the 1972-77 period is more 
complicated.  The EPA did not publicly announce them in the early years of regulation and I was told 
that records from that period ￿no longer exist.￿  Consequently, I filed a freedom of information act 
request and obtained the EPA￿s ￿Quick Look Report￿ data file, which contains annual summary 
information on the readings from each EPA pollution monitor.
41  This file is used to replicate the EPA￿s 
regulation rule; counties, with monitor readings exceeding the pollutant-specific national standard in 
1972 are assigned to the pollutant-specific nonattainment category for the 1972-1977 period.  All other 
county by pollutant combinations are designated attainment.
42  
 
b.  Determining Which Plants were Subject to the Regulations 
An important part of the analysis is the determination of which manufacturing plants (or 
industries) were not targeted by the regulations in the examined period.  A historical list of regulated 
plants or industries is unavailable from the EPA.  Consequently, I devised a system to divide the 
manufacturing sector into emitters and non-emitters that attempts to mimic the EPA￿s focus on the 
dirtiest plants and industries in the initial years of regulation.     
The EPA￿s estimates of industrial emissions are used to determine the pollutants emitted by each industry.  
These estimates are reproduced in Appendix Table 2.  The table lists the estimated annual emissions of each of the 
regulated pollutants by industry, as well as each industry￿s share of total industrial sector emissions.  Industries that 
are excluded from the table either produce negligible levels of the regulated pollutants or had escaped the EPA￿s 
attention as late as the early 1990s.  Communications with EPA officials indicate that it is unlikely that the excluded 
industries were subject to significant regulatory oversight in the 1970s and 1980s.   
                                                           
40 Vernon Henderson and Randy Becker generously allowed me to photocopy the relevant sections of the Code of 
Federal Regulations. 
41 This date file comes from the EPA￿s Air Quality Subsystem database and contains annual statistics on the readings 
from all state and national pollution monitors for the four criteria pollutants.  
42 I tested whether the results were sensitive to the choice of a pollution monitor-based definition of which 
county/pollutant combinations were heavily regulated for this period (i.e., 1972-1977).  The paper￿s conclusions are 




In assigning polluter status to industries, one possibility is to assume that the industries listed in 
Appendix Table 2 are regulated for all of the pollutants.  Since some industries are major polluters of a 
particular pollutant, but not of another, it is evident that this is not a sensible approach.  Consequently, I 
label all industries that account for at least 7% of the industrial sector emissions of a pollutant to be an 
emitter of that pollutant; excluded industries and those whose emissions fall below the pollutant-specific 
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  Nonattainment Period t  Attainment Period t-1  Nonattainment Period t-1 
    & Nonattainment Period t  & Attainment Period t 
 (1)  (2)  (3) 
Carbon Monoxide (CO)     
1967-1972 0  0  0 
1972-1977 81  81  0 
1977-1982 144  90  27 
1982-1987 137  15  22 
      
Ozone (O3)      
1967-1972 0  0  0 
1972-1977 32  32  0 
1977-1982 626  595  1 
1982-1987 560  104  170 
      
Sulfur Dioxide (SO2)    
1967-1972 0  0  0 
1972-1977 34  34  0 
1977-1982 87  75  22 
1982-1987 60  7  34 
      
Total Suspended Particulates (TSPs)    
1967-1972 0  0  0 
1972-1977 296  296  0 
1977-1982 235  108  169 
1982-1987 176  24  83 
Notes: There are 3,070 counties in the CM data files.  See the Data Appendix for a description of how 






























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































   
Table 4B: Estimated Regression Models for the Percentage Change in Employment 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
CO Regulation Effect  (β4)  -0.084 -0.075 -0.086 -0.163 
  (0.032) (0.031) (0.030) (0.045) 
      
O3 Regulation Effect (β5) 0.001  0.022  -0.011  -0.049 
  (0.011) (0.010) (0.010) (0.015) 
      
SO2 Regulation Effect (β6) -0.004  -0.016  0.003  0.001 
  (0.029) (0.028) (0.029) (0.036) 
      
TSPs Regulation Effect (β7)    -0.024 -0.010 -0.020 -0.024 
  (0.014) (0.013) (0.013) (0.024) 
      
R-squared  0.109 0.119 0.144 0.504 
      
Industry × Period Effects  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Nonattainment × Period Effects  Yes  Yes  No  No 
County Effects  No  Yes  No  No 
County × Period Effects  No  No  Yes  Yes 
Plant  Effects  No No No Yes 
Notes: See the notes to Table 4A.  In all specifications, the sample includes the 
1,620,942 plant observations with nonmissing and nonnegative employment.  The mean 
five-year growth rate of employment in the sample was -1.4%.   
Table 5: Estimated Regression Models for  
the Percentage Change in Capital Stock and Shipments 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Capital Stock      
CO Regulation Effect  (β4)  -0.047 -0.047 -0.097 -0.092 
  (0.043) (0.042) (0.043) (0.062) 
      
O3 Regulation Effect (β5) -0.009  0.016  -0.001  -0.041 
  (0.022) (0.021) (0.021) (0.029) 
      
SO2 Regulation Effect (β6)  -0.024 -0.048 -0.057 -0.063 
  (0.047) (0.049) (0.055) (0.048) 
      
TSPs Regulation Effect (β7)    0.026 0.042 0.010 -0.043 
  (0.027) (0.025) (0.024) (0.039) 
      
R-squared  0.074 0.109 0.155 0.462 
Shipments      
CO Regulation Effect  (β4)  -0.058 -0.036 -0.072 -0.146 
  (0.029) (0.029) (0.029) (0.046) 
      
O3 Regulation Effect (β5)  0.022 0.048 0.019 -0.032 
  (0.018) (0.018) (0.016) (0.024) 
      
SO2 Regulation Effect (β6)  -0.007 -0.026 -0.027 -0.010 
  (0.033) (0.030) (0.030) (0.039) 
      
TSPs Regulation Effect (β7)    -0.014 -0.002 -0.010 -0.032 
  (0.019) (0.018) (0.018) (0.034) 
      
R-squared  0.127 0.142 0.185 0.516 
      
Industry ×  Period  Effects  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Nonattainment × Period Effects  Yes  Yes  No  No 
County Fixed Effects  No  Yes  No  No 
County × Period Fixed Effects  No  No  Yes  Yes 
Plant Fixed Effects  No  No  No  Yes 
Notes: See the Notes to Table 4B.  The sample sizes are 1,607,332 plant observations 
for the capital stock regressions and 1,737,753 for shipments.  The mean five-year 
















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































   









  (0)  (1) (2) (3) 
Total Employment       
CO Regulation Effect  (β4)  -0.086  -0.094 -0.059 -0.097 
  (0.030)  (0.028) (0.023) (0.028) 
       
O3 Regulation Effect (β5)  -0.011  -0.007 -0.019 -0.016 
  (0.010)  (0.010) (0.008) (0.010) 
       
SO2 Regulation Effect (β6)  0.003  0.005 0.010 0.006 
  (0.029)  (0.027) (0.021) (0.028) 
       
TSPs Regulation Effect (β7)  -0.020  -0.013 -0.022 -0.013 
  (0.013)  (0.014) (0.011) (0.013) 
Capital Stock       
CO Regulation Effect  (β4)  -0.097  -0.134 -0.110 -0.115 
  (0.043)  (0.041) (0.033) (0.040) 
       
O3 Regulation Effect (β5)  -0.001  -0.007 -0.021 -0.009 
  (0.021)  (0.021) (0.016) (0.020) 
       
SO2 Regulation Effect (β6)  -0.057  -0.085 -0.032 -0.006 
  (0.055)  (0.045) (0.036) (0.052) 
       
TSPs Regulation Effect (β7) 0.010  0.002  -0.038  0.010 
  (0.024)  (0.024) (0.021) (0.033) 
Shipments       
CO Regulation Effect  (β4)  -0.072  -0.092 -0.048 -0.075 
  (0.029)  (0.027) (0.024) (0.027) 
       
O3 Regulation Effect (β5) 0.019  -0.019  0.000  0.016 
  (0.016)  (0.016) (0.015) (0.016) 
       
SO2 Regulation Effect (β6)  -0.027  -0.054 -0.023 -0.020 
  (0.030)  (0.025) (0.025) (0.030) 
       
TSPs Regulation Effect (β7) -0.010  -0.054  -0.037  0.008 
  (0.018)  (0.016) (0.015) (0.020) 
Notes:  See Notes to Tables 4b and 5.  The entries are the estimated regulation effects and 
heteroskedastic standard errors (in parentheses) from separate regressions for the three dependent 
variables.  The dependent variable is denoted in bold and underlined.  Each column represents a different 
specification or sample.  All specifications include county × period effects, and industry × period effects.  
The entries in column (0) are taken from column (3) of Tables 4b (employment) and 5 (capital stock and 
shipments) and should be compared to the other columns.  In column (1), the lagged dependent variable 
is included as a regressor and its effect is allowed to vary by the pollutant emitted.  The sample size is 
884,812 for employment, 921,403 for capital stock, and 944,596 for shipments.  In column (2), the 
sample is limited to ￿stayer￿ plants and the respective sample sizes are 762,513, 764,115, and 768,096.  
In column (3), plants are classified as an emitter of a pollutant if they account for at least 4.5% of 















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































   
Appendix Table 1: Selected National Ambient Air Quality Standards 
Pollutant  Maximum Allowable Concentration 
 (Primary  Standard) 
Nitrogen Dioxide  
     Annual arithmetic mean  .053 parts per million 
  
Ozone  
     Max 1 hour concentration  .12 parts per million (after 1979)  
  .08 parts per million (through 1979) 
  
Sulfur Dioxide  
     Annual arithmetic mean  .03 parts per million 
     Max 24 hour concentration  .14 parts per million 
  
Total Suspended Particulates  
     Annual geometric mean  75 micrograms per cubic meter 
     Max 24 hour concentration  260 micrograms per cubic meter 
  
Carbon Monoxide  
     Max 8 hour concentration  9 parts per million 
     Max 1 hour concentration  35 parts per million 
Notes: A county is in violation of the ozone or carbon monoxide standards if 
it exceeds the standard more than once in a year.  In the case of the nitrogen 
dioxide, sulfur dioxide, and total suspended particulates standards, a county is 
in violation if it exceeds the standard once during a calendar year.  In 1987 
the EPA began to switch their focus from the regulation of all particulates 
(i.e., TSPs) to small particulates (i.e., PM-10s).  In 1997 the ozone standard 
was revised and the particulates standard was further modified to regulate 
even smaller particulates (i.e., PM-2.5s). 
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